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A commentary on
Toward an experimental account of argumentation: the case of the slippery slope and the ad
hominem arguments
by Lillo-Unglaube, M., Canales-Johnson, A., Navarrete, G., and Bravo, C. F. (2014). Front. Psychol.
5: 1420. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01420
Lillo-Unglaube et al. (2014) argue for the employment of more descriptive and experimental
accounts on the psychology of argumentation. By utilizing experimental studies concerning the
slippery slope and ad hominem arguments using Bayesian (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007) and pragma-
dialectic frameworks (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004), they seek to show how psychology
can bring “the cognitive and normative accounts of argumentation closer” (Lillo-Unglaube et al.,
2014, p. 5) for an integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation.
Argumentation is a complex human activity. Its complexity stems from the fact that cognitive
agents in various situations perform multiple tasks in real-time to assess an argument presented
to them. These tasks involve the quantity, quality, and relevance of the statements that make
up the argument. To illustrate, suppose cognitive agent A is presented with an argument for
assessment. The quantity of statements included in the premise set has repercussions on what
A can correctly infer (e.g., an argument with a single statement for a premise greatly reduces
the number of inferential moves that A can make). It is also important for A to consider the
quality of the statements included in the premise set (i.e., whether or not they are true). Finally, A
must also consider the relevance of the statements included in the premise set to the conclusion
of the argument (i.e., the premise set must be connected to the conclusion). As an additional
complication, most of the time, cognitive agents are characterized by a condition of uncertainty.
For example, all the relevant premises are oftentimes unavailable to cognitive agents, they are not
always “in a position to know” (Sosa, 1995, p. 28), for instance, whether or not the premises of an
argument are true.
Lillo-Unglaube et al.’s paper seeks to explain the “rhetorical effectiveness” of some of the
informal fallacies. For Lillo-Unglaube et al., when cognitive agents are confronted with the slippery
slope and ad hominem arguments, they evaluate “the persuasiveness of the slippery slope argument
or the degree of unreasonableness of the ad hominem argument” (2014, p. 5).
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It needs mentioning that Lillo-Unglaube et al.’s work benefited
immensely from the works of Hahn and Oaksford (2007). For
Hahn and Oaksford, the Bayesian approach helps explain how
some informal fallacies can be reasonable inferential moves in
some argumentation situations. Viewed in its proper context (i.e.,
that the inference involved in the slippery slope and ad hominem
arguments is inductive), one can safely say that Hahn and
Oaksford’s analysis is concerned with argument strength which
can be understood in terms of degrees unlike logical validity. This
creates a potential problem for Lillo-Unglaube et al.’s proposal.
Suppose cognitive agent A is persuading B that C will cheat in
the upcoming final examinations on the basis that C cheated in
their final examinations in the previous terms. To be sure, such
an argument is persuasive or reasonable to hold. However, from
the point of view of traditional normative approaches, there is
a straightforward answer as to why A’s argument is defective:
its conclusion is not a logical consequence of the premise set.
From the point of view of the experimental account by Lillo-
Unglaube et al., however, the persuasiveness and the degree of
reasonableness of A’s conclusion would depend on the prior
probabilities that we attach to the premise set. Mindful of the
fact that these two approaches are different in the sense that
the nature of the inferences involved are different (i.e., logical
validity applies to deductive whereas argument strength applies
to inductive arguments), one may ask as to how Lillo-Unglaube
et al. can hope to bring these approaches closer together. If this
is correct, then it is also unclear as to how Lillo-Unglaube et al.
can maintain that the “psychology of argumentation provides an
integrative scientific perspective unlike normative or aprioristic
approaches” (2014, p. 5).
An option that is available for Lillo-Unglaube et al.’s proposal
is to explain rhetorical effectiveness (e.g., persuasiveness, degree
of unreasonableness) in relation to truth—a central epistemic
concept that cognitive agents aim at (Corner and Hahn, 2013).
This is in line with Hahn and Oaksford’s (2006a) view that
the Bayesian approach has considerable potential for advancing
epistemic approaches to argumentation and evident in the very
manner by which the Bayesian approach via probability theory
provides explanations for the quality of arguments that cognitive
agents encounter in real life (Hahn and Oaksford, 2006b; Corner
et al., 2011; Hahn and Hornikx, 2015). As is well-known, the
Bayesian approach interprets probabilities (which are measured
in numbers from 0 to 1 where the probability of a necessary truth
is 1) as “subjective degrees of belief” (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007,
p. 707). Another advantage is that truth is a central notion to
inference whether deductively or inductively. For example, it is
truth that is supposedly preserved in deductively valid arguments
(i.e., if the premise set is true, then the conclusion must be
true). In addition, it is the truth of the conclusion in relation
to the premise set that may vary in strength (e.g., weak, strong)
in the case of inductive arguments. Finally, it can accommodate
the lone reasoner by highlighting the idea that argumentation
has an intrapersonal aspect evident in belief formation as well
as belief change (Hahn and Hornikx, 2015). For instance, in
deciding what to believe in, a cognitive agent interprets all the
available evidences before her and then makes an inference.
In the process, the cognitive agent may form beliefs that are
epistemically responsible. A belief is epistemically responsible “if
an agent holds those beliefs on the basis of good reasons, with the
aim of attaining her epistemic goal. Both the reasons and the goal
are evidently part of the agent’s cognitive perspective” (Crumley,
2009, pp. 162–163).
In the end, if the goal is to have an integrated area of
research on the psychology of argumentation, Lillo-Unglaube
et al.’s proposal would benefit by including the notion of truth
in explaining the rhetorical effectiveness of the slippery slope and
ad hominem arguments in some contexts.
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